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ABS TRACT
StockholderTax Rates and Firm Attributes
This paper develops a rigorous theoretical model to assess when investor clien—
teles may be empirically identified using ex dividend day data and what firm
attributesthese clienteles should respond to. It then presents empirical results
for the period 1963—1977 suggesting that
(1) tax—based investor clienteles do exist, and are reasonably stable over
time
(2) these clienteles are strongly influenced by the dividend—price ratio,








Since first being hypothesized by Miller and Modigliani (1961), the
"dividend clientele" phenomenon of individuals in high tax brackets investing
in low dividend stocks has been the subject of several empirical tests utilizing
a number of methodological approaches. Though complete agreement is lacking
in these studies, the weight of existing evidence does appear to support the
presence of such a clientele effect in the United States.
Whether such sorting by tax rates occurs is important, because the be-
havior of a firm acting in the interests of its shareholders is likely to be
influenced by their tax rates. However, while there may be a negative corre—
lation between firm payout rates and shareholder tax rates, it is important
to know whether this is a result of the desire of high bracket investors to
avoid taxes on dividends, or whether low payout firms offer some other induce-
ment to investors in high tax brackets. For example, it has often been sug-
gested that wealthy individuals, presumably in high tax brackets, would invest
in riskier types of equity. As growth stocks are seen typically as riskier,
and also typically have smaller dividend distributions, one alternative
hypothesis might be that the observed dividend clientele effect actually has
nothing to do with taxes and dividends at all, but merely reflects wealthy
individuals holding risky stocks. Such a hypothesis may be evaluated if one
controls empirically for firm characteristics other than payout rate when
testing for the existence of the clientele effect, and this is done below.
Our results suggest the presence of a strong dividend clientele phenomenon,
even when care is taken to hold constant other differences among firms.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review
previous empirical work on the subject. Section III presents an extension
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model with personal and corporate taxes—2—
developed by Auerbach and King (1982). This model suggests the types of con-
straints on individual behavior and firm characteristics that would be required
for a clientele effect to exist and be measurable using stock price data from
ex dividend days. It also predicts how other firm attributes should influence
portfolio decisions by individuals. Finally, with it we can explicitly
evaluate the effect of firm dividend policy on stockholder utility and discuss
when wealth maximizing behavior is in the interest of the firm's owners.
In Section IV, we describe the data used and present estimates based on
the theoretical model developed in Section III. Section V offers some con-
cluding comments.—3—
II. Previous Findings About Dividend Clienteles
Probably the most straightforward way of testing for the existence of
clienteles is to examine individual portfolios and see how they differ by the
owner's tax bracket, and studies of such kind have been done. From survey
data, Blume et al. (1974) found that dividend—price ratios of investor port-
folios declined with the wealth and, presumably, the tax rate of the investor.
There was also some indication that wealthier individuals held riskier stocks,
as measured roughly by whether the issues were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or traded over the counter. On the
other hand, a more recent investigation by Lewellen etal. (1978), using
individual investor data supplied by a brokerage firm, suggests that tax rates
vary insignificantly over payout rate.
While such survey evidence is certainly useful and informative, there are
a number of questions it cannot answer. First of all, it is limited to
the behavior of individual investors, while a growing fraction of equity in-
vestment is undertaken by institutions, many of which are tax—exempt. Second,
when individuals in different tax brackets hold the same stock, it may be
those trading actively who influence the marginal decisions of the firm.
Such information is not available from cross—section survey data.
A second method of measuring the tax clientele of a firm is through an
examination of price movements around the day a stock goes ex dividend ——the
first day on which the owner of a share is not entitled to a previously de-
clared dividend.1 In the absence of taxes, transaction costs and uncertainty,
the price of a share of stock on the ex dividend day would have to fall by
the value of the dividend. The introduction of a single, uniform tax rate
Tondividends would lead to an equilibrium price change equal to —(1 —t)
timesthe dividend per share, since in purchasing the stock after the ex date—4—
an investor would forego only the net of tax dividend. With individuals in different
tax brackets, no equilibrium could exist without transaction consts, constraints, or Un—
ertainty. With progressive taxes, transaction costs anduncertainty, one may argue (as
done formally below) that, controlling for market fluctuations, theamount
by which a firm's share price drops on its ex date is related to some weighted
average of the tax rates of its stockholders.
There are different ways of controlling for market fluctuations tomeasure
these implicit tax rates. Elton and Cruber (1970) did so by takingmean
values of the ratio of ex day price change to dividend over a oneyear period
(April 1966 —March1967) for all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
grouped by deciles according to their dividend price ratios. They found a
strong and nearly monotonic increase in the implicit tax rate of firm clien—
teles, as measured by the extent to which this ratio is less than one in
absolute value, moving across decile means from high to low payout firms.
However, Black and Scholes (1973) found that, for successive periods, these
decile means tended to be quite unstable, frequently being greater than one
or less than zero, and often appearing to contradict the existence of a cl1en—
tele effect. Using their own methodology of constructing high and lowpayout
portfolios and adjusting the portfolio returns for risk by subtracting from
the daily return on each stock the return on a different portfolio with
similar risk characteristics, Black and Scholes found that there were no sig-
nificant differences in the of tax returns on the ex dates between high
and low payout portfolios. Though they took his as a contradiction of the
clientele effect, such a result could occur with a clientele effect present,
even with all investors receiving the same net of tax return. If d1 and
are the dividend and capital gain per dollar for firm 1, the net return
(ignoring capital gains taxes) to shareholders with tax rateTiis—5—
r =(1—
T1)d1+ g1. Thus, if the gross return d1 + is constant across
firms, so will be r. if Td is constant, not T1. This is perfectly consis-
tent with the existence of a clientele effect. However, since r. may also
dT
vary, and since T.d1 can increase or decrease with d even if ---<0,the
Black—Scholes result is really not informative about whether a clientele
effect is present.
Also using ex dividend day data, for twenty—nine of the thirty large
Dow Jones industrial firms over the period 1962—1977, Green (1980) estimated
pooled cross—section time series versions of the following basic equation:
=
A0+ A1d + A2d + A3M + (1)
where and are the dividend and capital gain per dollar on the ex
date t for firm i, and Mt is the weighted gross return on date t of the Dow
Jones industrials as a whole. This equation is very similar to that which
would come from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (discussed below) except
that the coefficient A3, which corresponds to the firm's "beta," orcorrela—
tion with the market as a whole, would vary across firms, and some measure
of the return on either a riskiess asset or a "zero—beta" portfolio would be
subtracted from g and Mt. Green found that A2 was usually significantly
negative, suggesting that an increase in dividend yield increases the abso-
lute value of and hence decreases the implicit tax rate of the
representative stockholder. However, aside from the earnings/price ratio
and fraction of the firm's shares held by institutional investors (neither
of which had a significant effect in the full sample), Green did not attempt
to control for firm characteristics in his regressions.
Using pooled cross—section time series monthly data for all New York
Stock Exchange firms, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980) estimated a version
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model resembling Green's equation, and found—6—
significant evidence of a clientele effect for the period 1936—1978. They
did not control for the importance of any other firm characteristics.
In summary, the results thus far indicate that some sorting by tax rates
among firms with respect to dividend payout does exist, and that some measure
of these tax rates can be obtained using ex dividend day data. However, such
estimates do not appear to be very stable and no attempt has been made to
estimate tax rates for specific firms. Our objectives in the remaining
sections of the paper are to develop a model based on optimal portfolio
behavior to determine how we should interpret results like those just dis-
cussed, and to extend the previous empirical findings to test whether other
factors can explain the existence of clienteles, and whether it is possible
to obtain a meaningful measure of the tax clienteles of individual firms.—7—
III. Financial Equilibrium with Taxes
As discussed in Auerbach and King (1982), the nature of financial equi-
librium, and even the existence of such an equilibrium in a world where indi-
viduals face different tax rates, depends crucially on the nature of constraints
placed on the behavior of firms and investors. As many types of constraints
may be envisaged, we begin by developing a model which assumes the absence of
constraints, and then consider the effects of imposing them.
This model extends that of Auerbach and King (1982) by treating explicitly
the dividend payout decision of the firm, and follows closely their analysis.
We consider a two—period model in which each investor m has initial wealth
consisting of claims on the debt and equity of each firm i. Each firm is
assumed to have a fixed production plan, issues a certain amount of risk—free
debt,2 B., in period 1, and pays a dividend D. in period 2. The market valua-
tion in period 1 of the equity of firm I is E.. Each investor purchases debt,
Bm,3 and equity in each firm i, E', subject to the budget constraint:
Wm=Bm+E (2)
in order to maximize the utility of his terminal wealth, which we assume to
be defined over its mean and variance:
Utm =lJIfl(utm(Gtm)2) (3)
If we let R denote the second period return to corporate debt, tc t
andt the tax rates on corporate income, personal interest and dividend in-
come, and personal capital gains income, respectively, and the value by









where p. is the mean total pre—tax return to firm and C.. is the covariance of
1J
the underlying total returns to firms i and j. Equation (4) takes account of the
normal provision that interest payments but not dividends are deductible
from corporate taxes.
The value of a dollar of retentions q,, need not equal one. In a
world where earnings not paid out to shareholders as dividends were redistributed
directly to stockholder in some other way,q. would have to be unity. However, where
such distributions, amounting to share repurchases, are precluded, or at
least hindered, and retentions are used to purchase new capital goods, there
are two reasons why q. may diverge from one. First of all, if there are ad-
justment costs to changing dividend or investment levels, reinvestment of
earnings may earn a positive or negative rent. This is the standard
"Tobin's q" argument. In addition, even without adjustment
costs, there need be no arbitrage condition setting q.1. This possibility,
explored in multi—period models by Auerbach (l979a, 1979b) and Bradford
(1981) rests on the notion that firms may reinvest retentions even if q<l
because of the preferential tax treatment of capital gains.4
Maximization of utility with respect to holdings of equity in each
firm yields using (2), (3), (4) and (5), the first—order conditions:—9—
D Em *
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C.=EC ,thecovariance of the total return of firm i with
1 1Jthetotal return in the economy.
To derive the optimal investor portfolios, we combine conditions (6) and
(7) to obtain (using the definitions of Gin, Am and Tm):
m * in C R —D/Ej 1—t
E (.1)(_i) =Ain[+ )( *I — — — ( p
(8)
.3j C1 C C/E. ifl1 ii g
Stacking these conditions for each individual in and solving for (ETh/E )ii
yields5—1 0—
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To interpret this condition, note first that without taxes, with (l —t) 1,
it is in accordance with the separation theorem, which dictates that all in-
vestors hold the same equity portfolio, with the total portfolio fraction
of equity held by each individual, ,dependingon the risk aversion para-
meter y". With taxes,individual m will hold the market portfolio only if all
firms have the same value of (R— D1/E1)/(C/E1) or if his relative tax prefer-
ence for dividends versus capital gains,
I
equals (l —tc)which
is a weighted average of this tax preference across investors. Otherwise,
individual portfolios will differ in a complicated manner. However, for









which says that individuals in high tax brackets will concentrate more in
stocks with low dividend price ratios and low risk, as measured by return
variance (or, here, also covariance with the market).6 Thus, a clientele
would exist not only with respect to payout rate, but also risk. As argued
by Auerbach and King (1982) ,thislatter, seemingly counterintuitive result
comes about because by holding safer stocks, high bracket investors can
hold a greater fraction of their wealth in the form of equity without in-
curring more risk. This outcome is independent of whether the wealthy are
more or less risk averse than the poor, for that would influence the total
amount of risk undertaken but not the composition of the equity portfolio.
Still maintaining the assumption of no constraints on investors, we can
rearrange (7) to obtain (letting d =D/E1):
Ag1 + G(1 —t)(d
—R)=(1—t0)(-)
(11)
Multiplying (11) by E./E, the fraction of firm i's equity in the total amount





where and dN are the weighted average values of g1 and d1 and CM =E
is the total risk in society. Combination of (11) and (12) yields
=— (l—t)d+ + (l —tc)dM)
+ (1 — —t)R (13)
*
C./E.
where 6.=11is the firm's "beta" as usually defined. As observed by
1
CM/EM
Gordon and Bradford (1981), this equation, which holds for all firms regard-
less of their clientele, predicts the same value for the coefficient of d.,
—(1
—ta).
Thus, the existence of clienteles could not be verified by—12—
attempting, as did Green (1980) and Litzberger and Rainaswamy (1980), to
detect differences in this coefficient across firms. Gordon and Bradford
therefore concentrated on estimating this parameter under the assumption
that it was constant across firms at any given moment.
However, this negative result depends crucially on the assumption that
individuals are subject to no constraints on their portfolio behavior.
Suppose we now impose a short sale constraint on the equity of individual
firms.(An alternative approach would be to introduce transaction costs.)
Equation (9) then would describe individual m's notional equity de-
mands only. Going back to equations (6) and (7), we would have to obtain a
new version of (7) by adding up condition (6) for unconstrained individuals
for whom E >0, arriving at an equation in which A and C would be replaced
by A. and C.., the latter values being weighted averages of Am and Gm for all
m with unconstrained equity demands for equity of firm f. Indeed the pattern
of constraints, while complicated, does not depend on an individual's atti-
tude toward risk, since the term in brackets on the right—hand side of (9)
varies among individuals only because of differences in tax rates. In the
simple case of independent returns, (10) applies and hero the pattern of
1 -tm







1 1atwhich the investor would wish to sell short.
C./E. 11
Inthe presence of short sale constraints, with A. and C. varying
across firms, (11) becomes
•1*AC





— . . Jij
Ag+ c(A,g) + (1 —t)[G(dM —R)+ c(G,d)) =(1—tc)(1E
)(12')—13—
where A andare sample means and c(A,g) and c(G,d) are sample covariances
and is the fraction of the equity of firm jheldby individuals also holding
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the pattern of stock ownership in the presence of constraints.
Thus, if we had data on g., d., g, dM, R and x, we could estimate -(1 —t)
and B*() for each firm, the former being a measure of the tax preference
of firm i's clientele. Even if x is unknown, but constant, we can obtain
unbiased estimates. However, there will be a problem identifying ,since
A.is unknown; itdependson the relationship between investor tax rates and
investor risk aversion. Assuming decreasing absolute risk-aversion, m de-
creases with wealth7 and, presumably, tax rates (at least for non—institutional
investors). Thus, Am =
1 would be expected to increase
1111(1 —t0)(l
—t)
with tax rates, for non—institutional investors. However, tax—exempt
institutions may behave more like high—bracket than low—bracket individuals
with respect to risk. Thus, the value of A1 for a given firm might rise or
fall with an increase in the tax bracket of the firm's representative share-
holder. Because of this, the coefficient of will probably be a biased
estimate of 3k,butthe direction of this bias is uncertain. We shall
return to this problem when discussing our empirical findings in the next
section.—14—
An interesting characteristic of equation (13') is that it holds regard-
less of what we hypothesize to be true about the values of q. for different
firms. This is helpful, because it allows us to test for the existence of
clienteles without knowledge of the value of q.. However, equation (13'),
and the other equations derived thus far, simply describe the characteris-
tics of individual portfolios and firm valuation, given firm financial
policy. The value of a firm's q would certainly be expected to influence
the financial policy it actually chooses, and this, in turn, will affect
the range of portfolio investments available to individuals. While a com-
plete discussion of firm objectives is beyond the scope of this paper, it
should be emphasized that if a firm has stock holders in different tax
brackets, they will normally disagree about what financial policy the firm
should follow.8 Moreover, in such a case, the concept of a unique wealth maxi-
mizing policy is not even well defined. If we rewrite (7), we obtain a
valuation equation for firm i in the absence of constraints:
A q1p1 A /q.
R _1()B1_(11 •:—l— (14)
C J
sothat firm value is
Aq.p. q.A D1
V =B.+ =' + (1—
q.)B1—_1t -
— 1)- (15)
Thus, value maximization is well defined and characterized by corner solu-
tions for either B1 or Di or both (for q. constant). However, even if each stock-
holder wished the firm to pursue a personal wealth maximizing policy, this
would not be one which maximizes V1, but rather one which maximizes
E. + B1, since any initial distribution of debtwould be taxed as
1
g
a dividend, while changes in equity value would be taxed at capital gains
rates.9 This would make the wealth maximizing strategy different for differ-
ent stockholders, and demonstrates the importance of knowing the ownership
patterns of firms.—15—
IV. EstimationResults
We have derived equation (13'), which will form the basis of estimates
of clientele tax rates for different firms. However, if we are actually to
use time series observations for a single firm to estimate its clientele, we
need to make some further assumption in order to identify the equation's
parameters. Otherwise, the clientele would change daily, with low—bracket
investors holding the stock on ex dividend days and high—bracket investors
holding the stock on other days. Following Green (1980), we argue that trans-
action costs preclude such daily tax arbitrage, imagining that investors
choose their portfolios according to the long run characteristics of the firm.
Nevertheless, within a clientele, trading around an ex date which would occur
for non—tax reasons may be delayed or speeded up, so that an equation like
(13') would still hold and could be identified, though the coefficient of d1
might yield a biased estimate of the implicit tax rate of this stable clien—
10
tele.
As stated above, equations similar to (13') were estimated for pooled
cross—section time series samples by Green (1980) and Litzenberger and Rama—
swamy (1980) (hereafter referred to as L—R). Green used daily data from ex
dividend days, omitted the interest rate from the set of explanatory vari-
ables, and assumed the market coefficient to be the same across firms. L—R
used monthly observations including those in which no dividend was paid, and
instead of estimating a market coefficient separately, inserted previously
(and inconsistent1y) estimated values of ..Greentested for the clien-
tele effect by including a quadratic term in the dividend—price ratio, while
L—R did so by grouping observations into five groups by payout rate.
We follow Green in using daily data. Since dividends occur within one
day periods, this should minimize extraneous price movements in share price—l 6—
which must be explained by other factors.It also allows us a larger number
of observations over a given time interval. Unlike Green, we also include
observations from days on which stocks do not go ex dividend, in order to
improve the efficiency of our estimates. Unlike any previous study, we will
attempt to measure the clientele effect by estimating impLicit tax rates for
individual firms, and then attempt to explain differences in the estimated
tax rates using firm characteristics.
Because we are unaware of any index of daily dividend yield of the market,
we simply use for a value of market return the Standard and Poor's index of
daily stock returns, which includes capital gains plus dividends. For the
risk—free interest rate, the shortest available series is a weekly return
on outstanding U.S. Treasury Bills, which has a correlation coefficient over
our sample of .996 with the monthly return on T—Bills. Our full sample esti-
mates use the latter while our subperiod estimates use the former. In neither
case is the interest rate a significant explanatory variable.
Our sample consists of 436 firms, this being the number for which obser-
vations were available for our entire fifteen year sample period (1963—1977)
on both daily stock prices and dividends and annual balance sheet and income
statement data The daily data was obtained from the CRSP (Center for Research
in Securities Prices) data file, and the annual data comes from Standard and
Poor's Compustat file. The sample of firms comes primarily from the New York
Stock Exchange, but does include twenty—five from the American Stock
Exchange.
The first step in our empirical work was to estimate for each firm a
simplified, stochastic version of equation (131)13
=+ + 2rM+ a3R (16)—17--
where the market return rM is the Standard and Poor's Index and the risk—free
rate R is the short—term (weekly or monthly) return on Treasury Bills. Aside
from all ex dates for ordinary dividends, data were also included for every
tenth trading day, except where such days coincided with a distribution
event (ex date, declaration date, etc.). This gives a sample size of about
450 observations over the entire fifteen year period, and 150 for each of
the three successive five—year subperiods for which estimates were also ob-
tained to test the stability of our results.
The intercept term a0 is predicted to be zero, but is included because
of the possibility of misspecification of the equation. The terms of inter—
est are c and a2. According to (13'), a1 should give the firm's value of
- (1—t),which should be a weighted average of the values of
i ltg
of the firm's stockholders. We will typically refer to this term as (1 —a),
where0 represents the differential tax rate between dividends and capital
14
gains.
Estimates of equation (16) were obtained for each of the 436 firms for
the full sample period and three subperiods. Summary statistics of the re-
gression results are listed in Table 1. As can be seen, a2 typically is
estimated with more precision than a1, though the average value of each esti-
mate fluctuates over the three subperiods. The mean value of .787 for a1,
and the implicit tax parameter 0 of .213, is very close to those obtained
by Green (1980) and by Gordon and Bradford (1980) using pooled data.
Though the estimated values of across firms are quite dispersed, only eight
(of 436) fall at least two standard errors outside of the interval between .3and
1, the technical bounds imposed by the tax structure. The mean value of .779 for
2 probably is less than one because of the way in which firms were chosen for
our sample, although the fact that a2 Is not an unbiased estimate of $ for any
firm might also play a role.—18—
Table 1





mean value .0008 —.0004 —.0001 .0013
mean standard error .0031 .0075 .0066 .0080
standard deviation of values .0035 .0076 .0072 .0082
a1
mean value .787 .747 .559 .862
mean standard error .251 .478 .538 .425
standard deviation of values .400 .950 .743 .601
mean value .779 .748 .915 .739
mean standard error .112 .224 .241 .164
standard deviation of values .355 .466 .421 .421
a3
mean value —.0001 .0003 .0000 —.0001
mean standard error .0006 .0019 .0012 .0013
standard deviation of values .0007 .0019 .0013 .0013
mean value —averageof parameter estimate over 436 firm regressions
mean standard error —averageestimated standard error of parameter estimate
over 436 firm regressions.
standard deviation of values —standarddeviation of estimated values over
436 regressions.—19—
Our theory suggests that firms have distinct clienteles that do not change
drastically over short periods of time. A test of this conjecture is whether
subperiod estimates of c are significantly correlated for the sample of
firms. The higher the correlation, the slower the shift in clienteles.
Table 2 presents simple correlation coefficients for the estimated values of
Also presented for comparison are the correlations for estimates of a2.
While significantly positive, the correlation coefficient of about .3 across
successive five—year sample periods for estimates of a1 is not overly impres-
sive. However, it should be remembered that these are correlations between
estimates, not true parameters. A rough estimate of the correlation between the
latter can be calculated by assuming estimation errors to have equal variance
across firms at a given time and to be independent over time. We can then
adjust the correlation coefficients in Table 2 by estimating the standard
deviation of the true values of a1 in each sample from the standard deviation
of estimated cx1's and the average standard error of such estimates given in
Table The resulting adjusted correlation coefficients give a much dif-
ferent picture, especially between the second and third subperiods, for which
the estimated correlation of the underlying values of a1 is greater than .7.
These results certainly seem to support the hypothesis that there are per-
sistent differences in the value of a1 and, presumably, the composition of
the tax clientele, across firms.
What influences the formation of these clienteles? The theory in section
III suggests, at least for the simple case of independent firms, that the
implicit stockholder tax rate S (1—
a1)should decrease both with the
dividend payout and the value of beta. However, portfolio behavior might
depend on other firm characteristics as well, given that our model Is not a perfect
description of the way the world actually works.—20—
Table 2
Correlations Across Subperiods
Estimated Parameter I/lI Il/Ill I/Ill
unadjusted .272 .347 .267
(adjusted) (.456) (.712) (.437)
unadjusted .388 .444 .477





Using annual data from the Compustat file, we constructed for each firm
the variables listed in Table 3. No attempt is made to correct earnings and
assets for inflation and accelerated depreciation. These are difficult ad-
justments to make, and require assumptions about firm investment patterns
and capital asset characteristics. As our aim is to identify differences
among firms rather than levels, it is hoped that the variables as constructed
will suffice. We use long—run averages for such variables because our theory
suggests that clienteles form according to such long run characteristics, as
opposed to particular daily or quarterly values. Other variables tried in-
cluded the debt—equity ratio, which performed much like the debt—asset ratio,
the earnings growth rate, which performed much like the dividend growth rate,
and industry dummies which were always insignificant.
Using these explanatory variables, Z, we estimate the cross—section
equation
=z.-y + w. (17)
where 0. is the estimate of firm l's parameter obtained in the individual
firm regressions reported above. If our underlying model hypothesizes that
the true 0 equals Z1y plus a homoskedastic error term, then u. will be
heteroskedastic, with larger variance for those firms for which is esti-
mated imprecisely. We should therefore weight our sample by the inverse of
the standard deviation of w1, but this is unknown. The inverse of the
standard error of estimate of 0. provides a bound on the degree of weighting
necessary, since if the second stage error is large, very little hetero—
skedasticity will be present. Since we do have estimates of these standard
errors, we present regressions weighted in this fashion along with un—
weighted regressions, as a check of the sensitivity of our results to the—22.-
Table 3
Firm Characteristics for Cross—Section Regressions
S—Averagevalue of annual sales (in millions of dollars)
DIP— Averagequarterly dividend price ratio
P —Averageend—of—year price per share
B/A —Averageend—of—year ratio of long term debt (book value) to assets
(book value)
E/P —Averageannual earnings price ratio
D/D —Dividendgrowth rate; obtained by regressing annual dividends on a
constant, time and time squared, and dividing the slope by the fitted
value at the midpoint of the sample period
—Varianceof earnings around a fitted trend
a2 —Estimatedvalue of beta; first—stage regression coefficient of the
market return.—23—
use of the correct weighting scheme. Representative results for the full
sample estimates of 8 and the explanatory variables Z are presented in Table
4. The low R2 values must be seen in light of the fact that we are explaining
8 ,whichincludes an error presumably orthogonal to the right—hand side
variables.
The sales, earnings and price variables are all insignificant in both
weighted and unweighted regressions, even though one might construct hypo-
theses about portfolio behavior which would involve them. Aside from the
intercept, only the dividend—price ratio and debt—assets ratio are consis-
tently significant in explanatory power in the weighted regressions; only the
former is significant in the unweighted regressions. While their coefficients
are fairly stable, neither dividend growth nor earnings variance are significant,
though at times they are nearly so. The positive sign of the dividend growth
term may simply be helping to explain the dividend clientele effect, since it
presumably is negatively correlated with payout ratio and DIP may not perfectly
measure the relevant value of the payout. The earnings variance term should
be negative, according to our hypothesis. It thus has the wrong sign; the same
is true if we replace it with a measure of the firm's ,thecoefficient a2 of
the market from the first stage regressions (using two—stage least squares here
in the second stage with a2 endogenous, to purge it of correlation with the
estimation error included in 8, the dependent variable).
A disturbing aspect of the results in Table 4 is the instability of the
coefficient of the dividend—price ratio between weighted and unweighted versions
of each model. Such variation should not occur with a large sample if both
sets of estimates are consistent, as they would be is the estimated model were
correct. This suggests that the model as estimated may be misspecified.
Indeed, a test carried out following the method proposed by Hausman (1978)
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the model in (17.5) and (17.10)—24—
Table 4
Cross Section Results (Weighted)
Dependent Variable: e1 (from Full Sample Period)
Independent
Variable (17.1) (17.2) (17.3) (17.4) (17.5)
Intercept .473 .405 .437 .456 .453







DIP —19.7 —21.8 —22.5 —22.7 —27.8
(4.71) (6.16) (6.42) (6.46) (3.51)
B/A -0.272 -.231 -.309 -.231 -.230








.1377 .1346 .1246 .1256 .1256
t—statistics in parentheses—25—
Table 4 (continued)
Cross Section Results (unweighted)
Dependent Variable: e. (from Full Sample Period)
Independent (17.6) (17.7) (17.8) (17.9) (17.10)
Var jab le
Intercept .731 .636 .696 .610 .706







D/P -35.4 -41.1 -43.8 -42.3 -43.9
(4.85) (6.95) (8.00) (6.73) (8.04)
B/A —.269 —.248 —.240 —.245 —.246








.1691 .1641 .1606 .1591 .1602
t—statistics in parentheses—26—
is appropriately specified. However, this information is not very helpful,
since there are a number of alternative specifications one could propose. One
possibility is that the relationship between the implicit tax rate, 0, and
the dividend-price ratio is non—linear. For example, the change in the tax
rate might depend on the proportional change in D/P rather than the simple change
in level. To test this hypothesis, we add the term (DIP)2 to the model of (17.5)
and (17.10) and reestimate. The results for weighted and unweighted regressions
are shown in the first and third columns of Table 5, respectively, and labelled
(17.11) and (17.14). As hypothesized, the squared dividend—price ratio is
significantly negative; a unit increase in DIP has a larger effect on 0 for
small values of DIP than for large ones. A second result of the addition of
the new term to the model is that the debt—assets ratio is no longer significant,
or even important, in either weighted or unweighted specification. Omission of
this last term yields the estimates labelled (17.12) and (17.15) in Table 5.
While a Hausman test still rejects the hypothesis that the model in (17.12)
and (17.15) is specified properly, the test statistic is smaller than the
previous one by a factor of seven. Indeed, the relative closeness of fit between
weighted and unweighted estimates can be seen readily from Table 6, which presents
the values of 0 predicted by equations(17.l2) and (17.15) for values of the
dividend—price ratio varying from two standard deviations below the mean to
two standard deviations above. Also presented are the comparable values of 0
predicted by equations (17.13) and (17.16), which omit the squared dividend—price
term. The results from the non—linear model suggest that a one—standard deviation
increase above the mean in the dividend—price ratio is associated with a decrease in the pre-
dicted implicit tax rate of between .128 and .140; a decrease of one standard





Dependent Variable: 0. (from Full Sample Period)
Weighted Unweighted
Independent
Variable (17.11) (17.12)(17.13) (17.14) (17.15) (17.16)
Intercept .868 .885 .426 1.071 1.074 .688
(9.78) (10.18) (9.74)(11.13) (11.17) (12.27)
DIP —88.2 —92.9 —25.1 —120.1—123.9—46.6
(6.94) (7.92) (7.30) (6.98) (7.44) (8.92)
(D/P)2 2182.0 2314.9 3376.53483.9
(5.35) (6.02) (4.66) (4.88)
B/A —0.081 —0.129
(.97) (.87)
























Mean of DIP= .0102(quarterly)
Standard deviation of DIP= .0034—29—
Results for equations (17.12) and (17.15) for the three—year sub—periods
are shown in Table 7. They are more erratic, but the nonlinear specification
seems appropriate in all three cases. Experiments with additional explanatory
variables confirmed the finding from the full sample period that only the
dividend—price ratio is helpful in explaining differences in the implicit tax
rates of firms.
To summarize our empirical findings, there doappear to be significant and
persistent differences in firm shareholder tax clienteles, as measured by the
coefficient of the dividend—price ratio in equation (16). Only the long—term
dividend—price ratio appears to help in explaining these differences. The
significance of this variable strongly supports previous findings about the
dividend—clientele phenomenum, although the improved fit obtained by adding
the (D/P)2 term is a new result. One explanation for thismay be that our
measures of risk, the variance of earnings and the measured value of(the
estimate of a2 from equation (16)) are not very good. is measured very
crudely, and earnings themselves are measured with error. As shown above,
cx2 provides an estimate ofwith a bias of unknown sign or magnitude. Moreover,
our measure of the "market" is certainly not correct in accounting for all risks
borne by investors. Since, holding firm characteristics constant, an increase
in the firm's debt—equity ratio increases its true earnings variance and true
beta, it may be that the negative and sometimes significant, coefficient of the
debt—assets ratio means that firms which are riskier attract lower tax bracket
investors. Indeed, this would be perfectly consistent with the model developed
In the previous section.—30—
Table 7
Cross—Section Results
Dependent Variable: 0. (from relevant subperiod)
Independent
Variable Weighted Unweighted























In this paper, we have developed a model of individual portfolio behavior
that demonstrates when and how one might empirically test for the existence
of investor clienteles sorted by tax rate. The model predicts that sorting
should occur with respectnot only to the firm's dividend payout rate, but
also the riskiness of the firm's earnings, and its validity does not depend
on any assumption about how the market values a dollar of reinvested
earnings.
Our empirical results established first that it is possible to estimate
individual firm clienteles using daily data. This is important,because the
behavior of the firms themselves, which we have not explored empirically here,
should depend on the composition of their stockholders. Using our calculated
tax rates as dependent variables in a large cross section of firms, we cor-
roborated previous findings in support of the dividend clientele effect,
but found a non—linear relationship between the dividend—price ratio and the
implicit tax rate was superior to the usual linear specification.However,
little support for a sorting by risk was found. Further research seems
required on this point.—32—
Footno tes
1. The ex ante date is distinct from, and comes after. the declaration date, so that
new information imparted by the dividend declaration would already have
been reflected in a stock's price before the ex date.
2. This implicitly ignores such things as limited liability and inflation
risk. For an attempt to model portfolio behavior in the presence of
bankruptcy, see Auerbach and King (1981).
3. Since all debt is riskiess and hence identical, it is unnecessary to
distinguish holdings of the debt of specific firms.
4. It is important to emphasize that this differential valuation of capi-
tal gains and dividends has nothing to do with fallacious arguments
such as those attacked by Miller and Modigliani (1961) that capital
gains are "riskier" than dividends.
5. Similar results for the special case where qE1 may be found in Elton
and Gruber (1978) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980).




7. This may be seen by noting from (9) that the amount of equity held is
proportional to 1/yin, holding tax rates fixed.
8. See the discussion of this point in Auerbach and King (1982).
9. This argument is developed in greater detail in Auerbach (1979b).
10. See Green (1980) for further discussion.
11. This point is made by Hess (1980).
12. 'irms were also omitted that did not satisfy the following criteria
(1) Ordinary dividends were paid at least once in each of the years
between 1963 and 1977.
(2) The fifteen—year (1963—1977) average of annual earnings divided
by the fifteen—year average of end—of—year book assets was at
least .01.
(3) The fifteen—year average of annual dividends divided by the
fifteen—year average end—of—year book assets was at least.005.
The last two restrictions were applied to insure meaningful calculation
of growth rates for earnings and dividends.—33—
13. While (13') was derived in terms of expected returns, it is also a stand-
ard CAPM result that it applies as well to stochastic returns, with the
addition of an error independent of explanatory variables.
14. As Green (1980) pointed out, even if a clientele's composition and tax
rates remain constant over time, Oj will actually vary because of the
provision for taxation of capital gains upon realization. Green found
that allowing Oj to vary to account for this had a negligible impact
on his results.
0. 0.
15.The formula used is p.. =r.,. 1 J
1J 13(2—S2)"2(2 —S2)h/2 i I jj
whereo. is the sample i standard deviation of estimates of a1, S1 is
the sample I average standard error of estimate of a1, andnj is the
unadjusted correlation coefficient between periods i and j.—34—
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